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NOTE
IF YOU BUILD IT, HE WILL COME:1 JUDICIAL TAKINGS
AND A SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND
Ian M. Frame†
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution is a document that has been, and
continues to be, the subject of infinite debate and interpretation. At the
center of this debate are questions that initially seem deceptively simple, but
they have given way to a wealth of legal debate and a vast amount of
jurisprudential opinion. The outcome of these debates plays an
instrumental role in our everyday lives, affecting everything from civil
liberties to a citizen’s rights in private property and the extent to which
those rights can be disrupted by state intervention.
The Constitution is a document of enumerated powers.2 Commensurate
with the principles of federalism, those powers that are not specifically
ceded to the federal government are left to the states and to the people.3
This dynamic alone has been the subject of many contentious debates.4
† Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, J.D. Candidate 2012, Liberty
University School of Law; B.S., Old Dominion University. I would like to thank my family,
especially my parents, Rodney and Kay Frame, for without their unwavering love and
support I would have nothing in life. Additionally, I would like to thank my beautiful wife
Amanda, who has sacrificed her time and given her utmost dedication to support me in all of
my pursuits. Above all, I give all praise and glory to Jesus Christ, my Lord and Savior.
1. The title is derived from the film FIELD OF DREAMS. See FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal
Studious 1989). In the film, while working in his cornfield, the lead character, played by
Kevin Costner, hears voices saying “If you build it, he will come.” Convinced that these
voices desire him to build a baseball field, Costner plows over the majority of his cornfield to
build a baseball field. Once the field is finished, famous baseball players from years past come
to use the field as their own, depriving the lead character of his ability to produce corn.
During the film, the baseball players, while letting other in, refuse to allow Costner to enter
the area behind the outfield perimeter.
2. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995).
3. The Tenth Amendment explicitly provides that those powers that are not given
directly to the federal government by the Constitution are reserved for the states and the
people. U.S. CONST. amend. X. This amendment was implemented to preserve the freedom
and independence of the sovereign states. See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733
(1931).
4. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (beginning its discussion of the
extent of the power granted to the federal government under the Commerce Clause by
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Those powers expressly given to the federal government are divided among
the three equal branches: executive, legislative, and judicial.5 Implicit in
these powers are the functions of government that each branch was created
to perform. As Alexander Hamilton wrote:
The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the
sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the
purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of
every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary,
has no influence over either the sword or the purse.6
Additionally, the Constitution can be described as a system of restraints
placed upon the functions of government.7 These restraints can operate
internally by putting restrictions on the operations and overt reach of
government control. These restraints can operate externally by prohibiting
the addition of government functions, laws, and controls that may conflict
with the Constitution, unless their validity is satisfied in the form of a
constitutional amendment or a constitutional convention.
The text of the Constitution contains express language stating the powers
and restraints that operate on each branch of government. Ambiguity exists,
however, where the text does not specifically direct the power or restraint
toward one particular branch. The question then becomes, to which branch
does the ambiguous clause or provision apply?
While the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment succinctly provides
an object and purpose, thus justifying its presence, it is silent on which
branch of government it restrains.8 This overt silence has led to much
debate as to which branch the Takings Clause applies and as to the real

recognizing the principle of the enumerated powers); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans.
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-48 (1985) (discussing the extent of governmental power and its
limitations on the federal government); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942)
(discussing the extent of the power granted to the federal government under the Commerce
Clause).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. I-III.
6. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
7. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528, 552.
8. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment does not operate in reference to
any specific branch of government. It simply prohibits the act of taking private property “for
public use, without just compensation.” Id.
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object of its carefully crafted language.9 This Note addresses the topic at the
forefront of the Takings Clause debate, namely, whether the Takings Clause
should be extended to the judicial branch through what is commonly called
the Judicial Takings Doctrine.
This Note focuses on the seminal case, Stop the Beach Renourishment,
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection10 (hereinafter “Stop
the Beach”), which articulates support for the Judicial Takings Doctrine. In
Part II, this Note examines the background of Stop the Beach and related
jurisprudence that reveals how the United States Supreme Court has
handled similar issues. In Part III, this Note discusses the theory of judicial
takings and analyzes what benefits and detriments the adoption of the
Judicial Takings Doctrine may trigger. It also explores whether a Due
Process analysis may provide sufficient protections in place of the Judicial
Takings Doctrine. In Part IV, this Note addresses the questions largely
unanswered by the Court and proposes a manageable standard to
determine whether a judicial decision has deprived a person of an
established property right. Finally, this Note discusses where the theory of
judicial takings stands after Stop the Beach and discusses whether a
subsequent court would stand on strong ground in adopting it.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause provides that “private property [shall not] be taken
for public use without just compensation.”11 The Clause is not addressed
toward any specific branch of government; it is concerned merely with the
act of taking property.12 There is no textual justification for saying that the
state’s power to take property shall vary by branch.13

9. See J. Nicholas Bunch, Note, Takings, Judicial Takings, and Patent Law, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1747 (2005); W. David Saratt, Judicial Takings and the Course Pursued, 90 VA. L. REV.
1487 (2004); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449 (1990).
10. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592
(2010).
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. This Note does not seek to address what just
compensation would constitutionally entail. Nevertheless, limited treatment will be given to
the notion that within the confines of the Constitution, courts lack the tools to grant just
compensation.
12. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
13. Id.
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The common taking occurs when a state exercises its power of eminent
domain by seizing private property for public use and providing the owner
with just compensation.14 A taking also occurs when the government uses
its own property in a way that destroys private property rights.15 The
Takings Clause applies as fully to the landowner’s riparian water rights as it
applies to the landowner’s estate in land.16 States also effect a taking when
private property is re-characterized as public property.17 This could occur
when a court orders a party to deposit a sum of money into a state account
held for the party’s creditors with a state statute mandating that interest
earned on that account be withheld from the party.18
Initially, the Bill of Rights applied exclusively to the federal government,
not to state governments.19 Beginning with the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868, the United States Supreme Court steadily declared
certain provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states by virtue of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.20 It was not until
1897, however, that the Supreme Court declared that the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment should be extended to the states.21
B. Property Rights of Florida Riparian Owners
Under Florida law, the State owns, in trust for the public, the land
permanently submerged beneath navigable waters and the foreshore, which
is the land between the low-tide line and the mean high-water line.22 This is
commonly referred to as the Public Trust Doctrine. The State has the power
14. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601.
15. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946) (holding that a taking has
occurred when the government takes an easement over property to fly low-flying military
aircraft over it, which in this instance, rendered the property uninhabitable due to the
amount of noise from the aircraft).
16. See Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. 497, 504 (1871).
17. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharm., Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163-65 (1980).
18. Id.
19. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833).
20. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
21. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897)
(holding that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment mandates that the states provide
just compensation when they take private property for public use, which was the first in a
continuing line of cases that extend provisions of the Constitution to the states).
22. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11.
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to sell this land, but only when doing so is in the public’s interest.23
Additionally, the law may authorize the private use of the public trust land,
but only when the use does not conflict with the interests of the public.24
Under Florida law, the mean high-tide line, which is subject to statutory
limitations, is the boundary between private beachfront and State-owned
land.25 These provisions represent a codification of Florida common law
represented by Article X of the Florida Constitution.26
In Florida, beachfront property owners, or littoral owners, have certain
additional property rights established under common law; some of these
rights are the right to access the water, the right to enjoy an unobstructed
view of the water, and the right to receive accretions to their littoral
property.27 An accretion is the addition of sand or sediment to waterfront
land that occurs gradually and imperceptibly—so slowly that one could not
see the change occurring, though the change is noticeable over a period of
time.28 When an accretion occurs, the littoral owner has a right for the
property line to adjust according to the new mean high-tide line.29
It is important to note that an accretion is different from an avulsion. An
avulsion occurs when there is a “sudden or perceptible loss of or addition to
land by the action of the water or a sudden change in the bed of a lake or the
course of a stream.”30 When this occurs, a littoral owner will not retain the
right to have the mean high-tide line continue as his property line.31 An
avulsion can also occur through artificial means.32 An artificial avulsion
takes place when a property owner or state actor suddenly and perceptively
expands land mass over an area that was once water.33 Concerning the
consequence of nullifying a property owner’s right to accretions, current
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. FLA. CONST. art. X.
27. See Thiesen v. Gulf, Fla. & Ala. Ry. Co., 78 So. 491, 500, 507 (Fla. 1918).
28. Bd. of Trs. of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Sand Key Ass’n, Ltd., 512 So. 2d
934, 936, 941 (Fla. 1987) (holding that a property owner who receives an accretion by
artificial causes is entitled to that accretion even if he is not the party who participated in the
actions that caused the accretion).
29. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2598 (2010).
30. Sand Key Ass’n, 512 So. 2d at 936.
31. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2598.
32. Id. at 2611.
33. Id.
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Florida law does not distinguish between treating artificial avulsions and
ordinary avulsions differently.34
C. The Beach and Shore Preservation Act
The Beach and Shore Preservation Act provides the State with the
authority to engage in renourishment projects for the benefit of its citizens
and establishes specific guidelines for initiating a project.35 When a beach
restoration is undertaken, the Florida Board of Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Trust Fund sets an erosion-control line.36 The erosioncontrol line must be set in reference to the existing mean high-water line,
although in theory it can be located seaward or landward of that.37 Once the
erosion-control line is recorded, upland owners no longer have the right to
have their property line increase with the mean high-water line through
accretion.38 Since the renourishment project reclaims or adds a perceptible
amount of land to the beachfront, it is likened to artificial avulsion, and a
property owner will no longer have the right to the close boundary he once
shared with the water.
D. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection39
In Stop the Beach, the United States Supreme Court examined Florida’s
power to restore beaches through a process called renourishment.40
Renourishment allows the State to deposit sand on eroded beaches
(restoration) and to maintain the deposited sand (nourishment).41 The
cause of action in Stop the Beach originated when the City of Destin and
Walton County applied for permits to restore 6.9 miles of beach that had
been eroded by a series of hurricanes.42 The project would add seventy-five
feet of dry sand beach seaward of the mean high-tide line, effectively

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
FLA. STAT. §§ 161.011 et. seq. (2002).
FLA. STAT. § 161.161(3)-(5) (2002).
FLA. STAT. § 161.161(5) (2002).
FLA. STAT. § 161.191(2) (2003).
Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592.
Id. at 2600-01.
FLA. STAT. § 161.021(3), (4).
Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600.
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depriving the littoral owner of his property line’s close proximity to the
water line and permanently severing any future right to accretions.43
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a
nonprofit corporation formed by individuals who own beachfront property
bordering the project area that the State sought to address.44 Petitioner
brought an administrative action to challenge the proposed project.
Petitioner’s administrative action ultimately was rejected, and the permits
to begin the renourishment project were issued to the City of Destin and
Walton County.45 Petitioner then brought an action in state court,
challenging the State’s actions on constitutional grounds.46 Petitioners
argued that the State’s actions of beach renourishment would constitute an
unconstitutional taking without just compensation in violation of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.47
The Court of Appeal found that Petitioners were denied two littoral
rights that had existed under riparian common law: the right to receive
accretions to their property and the right to have the contact of their
property with the water remain intact.48 The Court of Appeal found that
this constituted an unconstitutional taking that could not stand unless the
State could show it had an actual property interest in upland property or
initiated eminent domain proceedings.49 On appeal, the Florida Supreme
Court was asked to resolve the following question: “On its face, does the
Beach and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally deprive upland
owners of littoral rights without just compensation?”50 The Florida Supreme
Court responded in the negative.51 A rehearing was denied, and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.52
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Save our Beaches, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 27 So. 3d 48, 56 (Fla. 2006).
The named petitioner, Save our Beaches, Inc., was the other party challenging the Florida
administrative action. Both challenging parties are non-profit groups composed of private
property owners.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 59.
49. Id. at 60.
50. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla.
2008).
51. Id. at 1121.
52. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2600 (2010).
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The Supreme Court held in an 8-0 decision, from which Justice Stevens
abstained,53 that the State’s actions did not constitute a taking.54 Thus, the
Court affirmed the decision of the Florida Supreme Court. The basis for the
United States Supreme Court’s decision was that a taking cannot occur
unless it can be shown that littoral property owners had rights to future
accretions and contact with the water that were superior to the State’s right
to fill in its submerged land.55 Under Florida property law, the State, as
owner of land seaward of the mean high-tide line, has the right to fill that
land, notwithstanding possible interference with the rights of the littoral
landowners.56 Since renourishment constitutes an avulsion that exposes
land seaward of the littoral property, that land belongs to the State, even
though it interrupts the littoral owner’s contact with the water.57 Because
the littoral owner will no longer have the right to have his property line
maintained at the mean high-tide line, he will no longer have the right to
accretions.
The Court admitted that the result may seem counter-intuitive on its
face.58 “After all, the Members’ property has been deprived of its character
(and value) as oceanfront property by the State’s artificial creation of an
avulsion.”59 The Court made the distinction that while this was an artificial
avulsion, there was nothing in prior Florida law that gave different legal
treatment to an artificial avulsion in contrast to one occurring naturally.60
Additionally, the Court stated that there is jurisprudence suggesting they
should be treated the same.61 Notably, the Court did not render a judgment

53. It is noted that Justice Stevens’s recusal from this decision is due to his ownership of
beach-front property in Florida. See Lisa McElroy, The last week of opinions in plain English,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2010, 8:56 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/06/the-last-weekof-opinions-in-plain-english/.
54. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2613.
55. Id. at 2611-13.
56. See Hayes v. Bowman, 91 So. 2d 795, 799-800 (Fla. 1957).
57. See Bryant v. Peppe, 238 So. 2d 836, 837 (Fla. 1970).
58. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2612.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. (“Perhaps state-created avulsions ought to be treated differently from other
avulsions insofar as the property right to accretion is concerned. But nothing in prior Florida
law makes such a distinction, and Martin suggests, if it does not indeed hold, the contrary.”);
see also Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 287 (1927) (holding that the draining of a state-owned
swamp that borders a property owner’s land constitutes an avulsion that does not vest the
upland owner with title to the newly exposed land).

2011]

IF YOU BUILD IT, HE WILL COME

117

on whether an artificial avulsion could ever constitute a taking—leaving
open the possibility that a higher degree of property deprivation might
merit revisiting the issue.
Property law is a product of the common law, and property rights
“extend only as far as state property law says they do.”62 States have a great
deal of discretion in deciding how far they will extend property rights.63
Since the Takings Clause protects property rights only as established under
State law, the Court found it was not free to decide how these property
rights ought to have been established.64
Petitioner also argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision
constituted a taking of Petitioner’s littoral rights, contrary to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.65 This issue was
the source of vigorous disagreement among the members of the Court. Not
only was there no clear majority, but the Justices’ opinions were also very
different in character and substance.66
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, supported a Judicial
Takings Doctrine.67 The plurality justified this approach by implementing a
textual analysis. “There is no textual justification for saying that . . . a State’s
power to expropriate private property without just compensation varies
according to the branch . . . it would be absurd to allow a State to do by
judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative fiat.”68
The plurality also articulated that “if a court declares that what was once an
established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken that
property in violation of the Takings Clause.”69 Under this test, if it were
found that a court rendered a decision that violated the Takings Clause,

62. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporation and the
Roots of the Takings “Muddle,” 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 833-34 (2006) (“For most purposes we
still adhere to the view that state law, not federal law, is the primary source and determinant
of the scope and limits of property.”).
63. See id. at 834.
64. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2612.
65. Id. at 2600.
66. Id. at 2592, 2596, 2613, 2618 (providing examples of the plurality and concurring
opinions of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Breyer).
67. Id. at 2597 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
68. Id. at 2601 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 2601.
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then there would be no need for compensation because the decision would
simply be invalid.70
The remaining Justices took markedly different directions on the issue of
the Takings Clause. A concurring opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy,
endorsed a Due Process Clause analysis as an alternative to a Judicial
Takings Doctrine: “The Court would be on strong footing in ruling that a
judicial decision that eliminates or substantially changes established
property rights, which are a legitimate expectation of the owner, is ‘arbitrary
or irrational’ under the Due Process Clause.”71
The other concurring opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, agreed that no
taking had occurred, but refused to adopt either approach taken by the rest
of the Court. Justice Breyer argued that it was unnecessary for the Court to
establish a specific standard of analysis for resolving the issue.72 Despite the
divergence in methodology represented by the plurality and concurring
opinions, a six-member majority of the Court felt that there should be a
remedy when it is held that a judicial decision eliminates or substantially
changes an established property right.73 This stands for the proposition that
judicial development of the common law has the ability to violate the
Constitution in the same way that a legislative or executive development
could.
E. The Judicial Takings Doctrine
The modern basis for the Judicial Takings Doctrine is grounded in a
textual approach to interpretation. The text of the Takings Clause is not
directed toward any particular branch of government and is concerned only

70. Notably, the plurality’s test for the Judicial Takings Doctrine did not include a
manageable standard that a subsequent court could use to determine whether a property
owner suffered a deprivation of established property rights. This lack of a manageable
standard will be discussed more extensively in Part III.C.
71. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reasoning that since the Court unanimously
agreed that no taking had occurred, the question of what should occur when it is found that
a judicial decision has changed or destroyed a once established property right should be left
for another day).
73. This assertion is represented by Justice Scalia’s and Justice Kennedy’s opinions. Id. at
2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Id. at 2615 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). The fact that a
majority of the Court agreed that there should be a remedy when it is found that a judicial
decision eliminates a property right supports the notion that the application of a doctrine
that limits a judicial change in property law is an idea that the court endorsed.
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with the act of taking rather than with the branch performing the act.74
Since the State’s power to expropriate private property does not vary
according to which branch performs the act, the argument follows that the
restrictions of the Takings Clause should be applied neutrally to restrain
any branch of government from committing acts that effect a taking.75
From a textual perspective, it is unlikely that the authors of the Bill of
Rights considered the applicability of the Takings Clause provisions to the
judiciary.76 The original understanding was too narrow to raise the issue.77
The Takings Clause addressed not an indirect, regulatory taking that a
judicial property change resembles, but rather a traditional exercise of
eminent domain.78 That the power of the purse was vested exclusively in the
legislature79 gives rise to the notion that the founders did not foresee the
judiciary as having the ability to effectuate a full constitutional taking. How
could a branch of government provide for just compensation if it is without
authority to do so? This is not meant to postulate that the founders believed
the Takings Clause provisions to be inviolable by the judiciary, but simply
that a taking could not occur under the judicial branch because the
judiciary was without the tools or authority to provide for just
compensation.
The first case to suggest that takings protections were applicable to the
judiciary was also the case that established that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the states—Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago.80 In that case, the United States Supreme
Court unanimously held that the takings protections applied to the courts:
In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be
authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for the
state or under its direction for public use, without compensation
made or secured to the owner, is, upon principle and authority,
wanting in the due process of law required by the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment of the [C]onstitution of the United States, and the
affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the state is a
74. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Stevens v. Cannon Beach, 114 S. Ct. 1332, 133435 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
75. See, e.g., Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601.
76. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1458.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
80. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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denial by that state of a right secured to the owner by that
instrument.81
In Muhlker v. New York & Harlem Railroad,82 the Supreme Court was
asked to review a New York Court of Appeals decision that denied the
plaintiff recovery in a dispute over easements.83 The plaintiffs were property
holders who sought to enjoin the defendants from building an elevated
railway that would violate the plaintiffs’ property easements to light, air,
and access.84
The Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals, holding
that the elevated railway took the plaintiffs’ property and impaired their
contractual rights, which flowed from deeds to the street that had been
conveyed by a predecessor-in-interest to the city, providing that an elevated
railway would not burden the property.85 In Justice McKenna’s plurality
opinion, the Court implied that courts could not constitutionally strip
owners of their property in the name of judicial expediency in overruling
prior precedents.86 In Muhlker, the plaintiffs challenged the New York
statute that authorized construction of the elevated railway rather than the
New York Court of Appeals’ decision disavowing and distinguishing its
prior precedents.87 In this context, Justice McKenna’s opinion can be
interpreted as “addressing not the power of state courts to change property
law, but rather their power to insulate a legislative taking from
constitutional review by asserting that a property right never existed.”88
This opinion was contrasted by the concurring opinion of Justice
Holmes, who strongly objected to the possibility that a federal court should
have the power to interfere in a matter directly related to state law.89 Justice
Holmes opined that property law was a “construction of the courts,” and
that state courts should be free to change the law at will without
constitutional restrictions.90 The view expressed by Justice Holmes stands

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 241.
Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905).
See id. at 563.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 568.
Thompson, supra note 9, at 1464.
Muhlker, 197 U.S. at 561.
Thompson, supra note 9, at 1464.
Muhlker, 197 U.S. at 572-73.
Thompson, supra note 9, at 1465.
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for the proposition that there are no constitutional restrictions on a state
court’s changing of existing state property law.91 It has been noted that
Justice Holmes’s position may be more complex.92 Significantly, Justice
Holmes noted that if the change in law had been a result of a legislative,
rather than a judicial, action he still would not have found a taking.93 This
suggests that Justice Holmes espoused that a particularly high threshold
must be met before a taking will occur.
A few decades later, the Court transitioned to a view consistent with
Justice Holmes’s opinion in Muhlker.94 In the 1930s, the idea that judicial
changes in the law could affect a taking was strongly rejected.95 In
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,96 the Court emphasized in
dicta that mere changes in the law did not present a constitutional question
and that “constitutional restrictions on changes in the common law were
inconsistent with the very nature of common law.”97
Only two years after Hill, the Court again considered the question of
whether a judicial change in property law by a state court can create a
constitutional issue. In Great Northern Railway v. Sunburst Oil & Refining
Co.,98 the Court found that a change in the law, without more, did not
present a constitutional issue.99 In Great Northern Railway, Justice
Benjamin Cardozo found that a state court could overrule a prior case only
prospectively.100
Professor Barton H. Thompson opined that by the end of the New Deal,
it seemed that the Court had disposed of the concept of judicial takings.101
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that courts could take property
by changing the law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continued to follow
the Muhlker view that the Court could reconsider a state court decision if a

91. Id.
92. Sarrat, supra note 9, at 1504.
93. Id.
94. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930); see also Thompson,
supra note 9, at 1465.
95. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1465.
96. Brinkerhoff-Faris, 281 U.S. 673.
97. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1466; see also Brinkerhoff-Faris, 281 U.S. at 681 n.8.
98. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
99. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1467.
100. Sunburst Oil, 287 U.S. at 358.
101. Thompson, supra note 9, at 1467.
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property holder challenged a legislative or executive action as a taking and
the state court ruled there was no property to take.102
After Great Northern Railway, the idea of judicial takings lay dormant for
more than three decades until the Supreme Court breathed new life into the
theory. In Hughes v. Washington,103 the Court was asked to determine
whether a property owner or the State took possession to an accretion that
had been gradually deposited on the portion of the owner’s property
abutting the ocean.104 The Supreme Court held that the ownership was an
issue of federal law, not state law; and under federal law, the plaintiff was
the proper owner of the accretions.105
Concurring in the opinion, Justice Potter Stewart wrote that the majority
opinion was based upon insufficient analysis.106 Justice Stewart argued that
ownership was an issue of state law; the Fourteenth Amendment restricts
states from taking property without just compensation “no less through its
courts than through its legislature,” and the Washington Supreme Court
was bound to observe a 1946 state decision that said accretions belong to
the adjoining land owner.107
After Hughes, the Court has been hesitant to take up judicial takings to
any great degree. In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,108 the United
States Supreme Court was asked to review a California Supreme Court
decision that required public shopping centers to permit political
petitioners on their premises, contrary to earlier precedent.109 The plaintiff
challenged the decision under the Takings Clause and argued that the
California Supreme Court’s decision constituted a judicial taking.110 The
United States Supreme Court declined to adopt a judicial takings test and
decided the case using a conventional takings standard.111 The Court

102. Id.; see also Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust, 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944); Broad
River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 282 U.S. 187, 191 (1930); Fox River Paper Co. v. R.R.
Comm’n, 274 U.S. 651, 654-57 (1927).
103. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
104. Id. at 290-91.
105. Id at 291.
106. Id. at 298 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Thompson, supra note 9, at 1468.
107. Hughes, 389 U.S. at 298 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also Thompson, supra note 9, at
1468.
108. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
109. Id. at 79-80; see also Thompson, supra note 9, at 1469.
110. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 74.
111. Id. at 82-84.
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concluded that although there had been a taking of property, since the value
and use of the shopping center were not unreasonably impaired, it did not
constitute a judicial taking.112 While the Court did not rule on the claimed
taking by “judicial reconstruction” of the state’s laws, it did suggest that a
taking by judicial action is conceivable.113
In 1992, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council114
considered whether a State law that denied a property owner all beneficial
economic use of his land would constitute a taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.115 In Lucas, the petitioner had purchased coastal property with
the intention of building homes on it as other neighboring owners had
done.116 After the petitioner purchased the property, the South Carolina
legislature passed a law that prohibited significant construction on his land,
rendering his property valueless.117 While the Supreme Court ultimately
overturned South Carolina’s law as an unconstitutional per se taking, the
Court left an interesting exception to the rule intact.118 The exception
provides that if the property owner never had the right to engage in the
desired use of the property according to the background principles of the
state’s property law, then just compensation need not be provided.119
The Court’s opinion in Lucas is particularly important to note when
approaching the idea of judicial takings addressed in Stop the Beach. While
the Lucas Court addressed the issue of background principles when
reviewing state property law, it did not determine what exactly constitutes
background principles and which branch can provide these principles.120
III. ADEQUACY OF REMEDIES: JUDICIAL TAKINGS V. DUE PROCESS
The decision in Stop the Beach offers two distinct options that
subsequent courts could adopt when considering whether a state court’s
action has constituted a taking in violation of the Takings Clause. Many
112. Id. at 88.
113. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2602 (2010).
114. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
115. Id at 1006-07.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1007.
118. David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial
Takings, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1375, 1378-79 (1996).
119. Id. at 1010; see also Sarrat, supra note 9, at 1489.
120. Bederman, supra note 118.
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recent Supreme Court cases, including Lucas and Stop the Beach, have
focused on a state legislature’s actions that restrict a property owner’s right
to develop or enjoy coastal property.121 With the continuing development of
private property on the nation’s coastlines and the growing movement to
preserve environmental and aesthetic elements of our seashores, the balance
between these interests will likely rest in judicial determinations and the
methodology that subsequent courts choose to adopt. These judicial
determinations have compelling implications in the subject of private
property rights and economic stability.
The remainder of this Note will not seek to strike a balance between
these competing interests. This Note instead focuses on the two competing
methodologies articulated in Stop the Beach to assess whether a state court’s
ruling has deprived an owner of a property right: Judicial Takings and Due
Process. Significantly, this Note addresses the doctrine of artificial avulsion
and incorporates the doctrine into the methodological analysis.
A. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection
The Judicial Takings Doctrine argued for in Stop the Beach is easily
explained. If it is found that a court deprives an individual of an established
property right, then the court has effected a taking.122 Under this test, if it is
determined that a court’s action constitutes a taking, no compensation will
be considered, and the lower court’s ruling will be overturned.123
Ostensibly, Lucas and Stop the Beach share many similarities regarding
the circumstances that brought the cases to court. Both cases were initiated
because of an alleged deprivation of property rights by each case’s respective
state legislature. While the Lucas Court found that the legislature’s actions
were per se unconstitutional, the door left open by the Court is arguably the
same door that enabled the Florida legislature to implement the
renourishment process that led to the dispute in Stop the Beach.124

121. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2599 (2010); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
122. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601.
123. Id.
124. This is demonstrated by the Court’s silence in Lucas as to what exactly the
background principles are that define whether a property owner has the right to engage in a
particular use of his land and whether that right is established. These background principles
are important factors when determining whether a property owner has an established right

2011]

IF YOU BUILD IT, HE WILL COME

125

The test proposed by the plurality in Stop the Beach outlined two prongs
that must be considered when determining whether a court’s action
constitutes a taking: deprivation and an established property right.125
Additionally, the plurality posits that the test incorporates a considerable
degree of deference to state courts:126 “A property right is not established if
there is doubt about its existence; and when there is doubt we do not make
our own assessment but accept the determination of the state court.”127
On its face, this test makes sense because the Takings Clause protects
property rights only as established according to state law, not according to
how the courts think property rights should be established.128 The test
stands for the proposition that if a property right is in dispute, then it will
neither be interpreted as an established property right nor will the property
owner be afforded the benefit of using the Judicial Takings Doctrine.
While courts will defer to state property law, the courts will not defer to
state judges whose challenged decisions deprive claimants of established
property rights.129 This is because an alleged Takings Clause violation is a
question of law under the Federal Constitution. Similarly, in a situation
where it is alleged that a state has violated an individual’s right to Due
Process, there is no deference afforded to a state court’s decision that
interprets the Federal Constitution.130
Notably, the Court did not articulate a test to determine whether a
deprivation of a property right has occurred. In balancing the interests of a
property owner and the state, it is crucial to determine whether an actual
deprivation of property occurred. In Stop the Beach, the Court did not need
to approach the question of what degree of deprivation is needed to
constitute a taking of an established property right. The Court found that
Petitioner had no established property right for the property to maintain
contact with the water line, meaning that Petitioner did not have a right of

to engage in a particular use of his land and the corollary question of how to determine if the
state has deprived him of that right.
125. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2608.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2608 n.9.
128. Id. at 2612.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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which it could be deprived.131 Part IV further discusses this crucial
distinction.132
B. Implementation of a Judicial Takings Doctrine
Until Stop the Beach, little modern jurisprudential authority advocated a
Judicial Takings Doctrine. Accepting a Judicial Takings Doctrine would
present the corollary question of what remedy should be applied. Within
the confines of judicial authority, it is difficult to imagine a court-provided
remedy outside of a simple reversal of the lower court’s decision. This is
because the judiciary lacks the ability to provide for compensation.133
Absent legislative intervention providing for a specific remedy, the judicial
branch would likely be confined to prudential remedies without a
compensation element.
Legislation-driven alternatives proposed by scholars could provide
different remedies to the problem of compensation if it is found that a
judicial action constitutes a taking. Professor Thompson theorized about
three such alternatives. First, the state court could decide not to change the
law at all.134 Second, the legislature could adopt an “automatic
compensation approach.”135 Under this approach, the court would make a
change in the law and would grant an order for the legislature to provide
just compensation.136 Finally, the legislature could adopt a “legislative
choice approach.”137 The court would issue a ruling contingent on the
legislature’s taking action within a prescribed period of time.138 If the
legislature did not act to provide just compensation, the decision would not
take effect.139
Adding a compensation element to the Judicial Takings Doctrine would
streamline the process, creating efficiencies within the judicial and
legislative branches. If a taking is found, then it is possible that the judiciary
could dispose of the issue without the need to send it back to the legislature

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 2612-13.
See infra Part IV.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
See Thompson, supra note 9, at 1513.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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or agency for additional consideration. This approach, however, would
constitute a massive delegation of legislative power to the judiciary. Adding
a compensation element would give the judicial branch the power to make
legislative decisions based on the underlying public policy issues at stake.
Any approach like this would have to originate in the legislature and would
present serious constitutional questions that are beyond the scope of this
Note.
C. Judicial Takings as a Remedy to Economic Deprivation
In Stop the Beach, the Justices unanimously agreed that Florida’s
renourishment process created an artificial avulsion and did not constitute
a taking.140 The question of whether an artificial avulsion could ever
constitute a taking was not presented, and the Court did not make a
determination, express or in dicta, on whether a state-created artificial
avulsion could ever constitute a taking.141 The implications from Stop the
Beach are that the Court intentionally left this question open for another
day and that a state-sanctioned act may constitute a taking if a greater
deprivation of private property can be shown.
Stop the Beach was a facial challenge to the Beach and Shore Preservation
Act.142 In addition to the facial challenge, Petitioners alleged that the Florida
Supreme Court’s decision constituted a taking in violation of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.143 Petitioners did not
allege any quantifiable amount of economic deprivation as a result of the
decision.
If a similar case presented itself where a property owner could prove a
quantifiable economic deprivation, then the Court might be more inclined
to grant relief. Instead of a group of private property owners, as in Stop the
Beach, what if the Court were presented with a petitioner who operated a
large full-service luxury resort? Further, assume this resort owner contends
that the resort’s attraction is cabana-style beach house rentals only twentyfive feet from the high tide marker. Additionally, the resort owner can prove
that an artificial avulsion, adding several feet of public beach between the
water and his property, will result in substantial economic hardship for the
140. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592,
2612 (2010).
141. See generally Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592.
142. Walton Cnty. v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla.
2008).
143. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600.
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resort. Under this hypothetical, assume that the Florida Supreme Court
ruled that the State’s actions did not constitute a taking and that the Florida
Supreme Court grounded its decision in a determination that an artificial
avulsion does not constitute a taking.
In this hypothetical, the Supreme Court of Florida followed the Lucas
Court’s background principles test and determined that an artificial
avulsion does not constitute a taking as the linchpin in depriving the resort
owner of economic recourse.144 Notably, the court’s decision interpreting,
and arguably changing state common law, resulted in the alleged taking.145
Under the test proposed in Stop the Beach, the court has not necessarily
deprived a person of an established property right. The court, in this
hypothetical, merely clarified a previously unclear property entitlement;
therefore, the court cannot be said to have violated the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.146
The distinction between Stop the Beach and the hypothetical lies in the
ability to quantify actual economic deprivation. “While property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking.”147 Additionally, a regulation that deprives a property owner of
all economically beneficial use of his property will constitute a taking.148
While the hypothetical presents an alleged judicial taking, not a regulatory
taking, the plurality in Stop the Beach argues that there is no reason to treat
either form of taking differently.149
The question thus becomes: under the judicial takings test in Stop the
Beach, can a proven quantifiable economic deprivation be a basis for a
judicial takings remedy? Additionally, it is unclear under the test whether
economic deprivation should be analyzed under the deprivation portion of
the test, under the established property right portion, or both. The test
articulates that if a property right is in doubt, it will not be an established
property right and deference will be given to the state court.150 It is not clear
144. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
145. This is because the state court interpreted state law and stated that an artificial
avulsion does not constitute a taking. The holding is now based on an interpretation of state
law that is not grounded in common law.
146. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2609.
147. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014.
148. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
149. See, e.g., Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2601, 2609 (holding that “there is no textual
justification for saying that the existence or scope of a State’s power to expropriate private
property without just compensation varies according to the branch”).
150. See id. at 2608 n.9.

2011]

IF YOU BUILD IT, HE WILL COME

129

whether the plurality’s test would be suitable for scrutinizing quantifiable
economic deprivation.151 If economic deprivation is not given recognition
within the judicial takings test, the test would prove to be an underinclusive and inadequate remedy.
While Lucas specifically concerned a regulation that eliminated all
reasonable economic use of a property and rendered the property valueless,
it did not answer the question of whether deprivation of any quantifiable
economic use of the property would constitute a taking. Additionally, the
concurring opinion notes the importance of incorporating reasonable
expectations into the analysis, specifically the reasonable expectations of the
property owner in terms of use of the land.152
Under the presented hypothetical, it could be argued that the resort
owner has a reasonable expectation to operate his business without
disruptive changes in the character and nature of his property. There is a
tendency toward circularity in these types of arguments since an owner’s
reasonable expectations are often shaped by what courts allow “as a proper
exercise of governmental authority.”153 Nevertheless, determining a
property owner’s reasonable expectations may not be a completely circular
endeavor since these constitutionally protected expectations “are based on
objective rules and customs that can be understood as reasonable by all
parties involved.”154
D. Substantive Due Process
The Supreme Court recognizes that the Due Process Clause is a
limitation on judicial power.155 Additionally, the “Court has long
recognized that property regulations can be invalidated under the Due
Process Clause.”156 Justice Kennedy used these two accepted premises as the
basis for his argument that substantive Due Process would provide a
remedy when a judicial decision eliminates or substantially changes
established property rights.157 Justice Kennedy stated: “The Court would be
on strong footing in ruling that a judicial decision that eliminates or

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See infra Part IV.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 1034.
Id. at 1035.
Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. (offering a string cite of supporting cases dating back to 1922).
Id. at 2615.
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substantially changes established property rights, which are a legitimate
expectation of the owner, is ‘arbitrary or irrational’ under the Due Process
Clause.”158
Courts, unlike the legislative and executive branches, were not designed
to make policy decisions about expropriation.159 In his concurrence, Justice
Kennedy argued that the separation-of-powers principles implicitly place
limitations on the courts.160 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the Due Process
limitation exists because the legislative and executive branches are
accountable for takings in their political capacity.161
Considering Justice Kennedy’s analysis, it is plausible that a Due Process
Clause challenge could be maintained under the hypothetical presented in
Part III.C. The success of this challenge, however, will hinge on whether the
Court determines that the state court’s action is arbitrary or irrational.162
Depending on how the Court applies the test, this may be a particularly
difficult standard to satisfy.
Justice Kennedy’s Due Process Clause analysis ostensibly validates it as
an adequate substitute for the Judicial Takings Doctrine. The disconnect in
the analysis seems to come in deducing that since property regulations can
be invalidated through the Due Process Clause, so can judicial decisions.163
This is a precarious deduction given the vast wealth of Due Process Clause
jurisprudence.
Additionally, the Court has long held that substantive Due Process rights
do not include economic liberties.164 If substantive Due Process rights
extended to an alleged judicial change in property law affecting economic
rights, it would signal a wholesale reversal in modern Due Process Clause
jurisprudence. The plurality in Stop the Beach stated that if a subsequent
court accepted Due Process as a remedy, it would be “a step of much greater

158. Id. at 2614 (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005)).
159. Id. at 2615.
160. Id. at 2605 (plurality opinion).
161. Id. at 2613 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 2615; see also Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the
decision “does not foreclose the possibility that a regulation might be so arbitrary or
irrational as to violate due process”).
163. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 2606; see also Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525,
536 (1949).
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novelty, [with a] much more unpredictable effect, than merely applying the
Takings Clause to judicial action.”165
This unpredictability would be compounded by the need to protect state
property law that operates within the bounds of the Constitution from
unwarranted judicial action that could interfere with a state’s sovereign
authority to enact common law. The need for a system of review that
affirmatively accounts for economic deprivation signals that a review under
the Due Process Clause would be unpredictable at best and wholly
inadequate at worst.
If Justice Kennedy’s arbitrary and irrational standard were adopted, it is
unclear how the standard would be implemented and what guidance a
reviewing court would have in reviewing a lower court’s decision.
Presumably, the burden of establishing that the court acted in an arbitrary
and irrational way would be allocated to the party complaining of the
property deprivation.166 In many cases that adopt this test, the controversies
result from a state or government regulation that has only an indirect
economic effect on the challenging party.167 Judicial decisions that have a
detrimental economic effect on property should be held to a higher
standard than what a Due Process review can provide.
IV. PROPOSAL
The viability of the Judicial Takings Doctrine depends largely on whether
the Court specifically tailors the doctrine to target judicial decisions that
trigger an actual substantive change in state property law. An important
consideration when making a decision regarding the applicability of the
Judicial Takings Doctrine is a proper determination of whether a judicial
decision actually changed a law or merely interpreted it within proper
judicial parameters.
In applying the judicial takings test, the Court should first decide
whether the lower court’s ruling affected an established property right. In
doing so, the Court should consider the property owner’s reasonable
expectation to this right in accordance with established state property law.168
This would provide an important baseline for incorporating economic
165. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2606.
166. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
167. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 485 (1955) (discussing a law
forbidding opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a prescription from an
optometrist or ophthalmologist).
168. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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deprivation into the analysis. A property owner’s expectation of economic
stability, in the face of state or court intervention with established property
law, is an important factor in determining reasonable expectations under
the Lucas framework.169
Second, to achieve the purported benefits of a Judicial Takings Doctrine
and to shield it from the potential usurpation of legislative power, the Court
should adopt a manageable standard to determine whether a deprivation
occurred. Adopting a manageable standard to determine whether a
deprivation occurred will retain the core of the plurality’s judicial takings
test in Stop the Beach.170 A manageable standard will supplement the test by
ensuring that the degree of economic deprivation is a relevant factor in
determining whether a deprivation has occurred. In making this
determination, the Court should give consideration to the following
relevant factors: the degree of deprivation,171 the departure from state
common law,172 and judicial decisions as a legislative taking.173
A. Degree of Deprivation
An important consideration in the analysis of whether a judicial taking
occurred is the degree of deprivation that a property owner realized as a
result of the court’s decision. While a legislature or administrative body
may look at several considerations in making a legislative determination,
including how the law or rule will be applied prospectively, a court’s
resources limit it from making broad, exploratory investigations. Therefore,
a court has the potential to inflict a greater deprivation of property rights by
its ruling, well beyond its original intent.
This factor would prove crucial to the determination because it would
incorporate the important element of economic deprivation. Under this
factor, a court would consider the economic deprivation that a property
owner suffered, or will prospectively suffer, as a result of a judicial change in
property law. Commensurate with the plurality’s position in Stop the Beach,
169. Id. at 1019 n.8.
170. The manageable standard proposed in this Note does not seek to redefine the Stop
the Beach plurality’s judicial takings test. This Note’s proposal only clarifies what a
deprivation can be and ensures that quantifiable economic deprivation will be given
consideration. If adopted, this proposal would provide subsequent courts with clarification
on how to determine a judicial deprivation of an established property right.
171. See infra Part IV.A.
172. See infra Part IV.B.
173. See infra Part IV.C.
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if it is found that a state court’s decision constituted a taking, then its
decision will be overruled.174
B. Departure from State Common Law
A measurable departure from established state common law would
trigger a presumption that the judicial decision went beyond mere
interpretation of existing common law principles. This factor would be
important because it would value the court’s role as an unbiased interpreter
of the law, rather than as an extra-judicial, legislative body.
Under the Lucas framework, the test would analyze the background
principles of common law and would determine whether the judicial
interpretation of those principles coincides with current state common
law.175 If it is determined that the court’s interpretation of the background
principles is inconsistent with state common law, then a Judicial Takings
Test would be implemented to determine whether a taking occurred as a
result of that interpretation.176
C. Judicial Decision as a Legislative Taking
If it is determined that a court’s action would constitute a taking if taken
by the legislature, then that court decision should be reversed as a violation
of the Takings Clause. This inquiry would be dispositive in determining
whether a judicial decision constitutes a taking. This test would ensure that
a judicial action is not insulated from a constitutional objection. This test is
presented with the caveat that a state retains the power, and the right, to
legislatively create state-specific property law.
If a state were to create a statute, like the court did through judicial
action under the hypothetical in Part III.C,177 then that statute could be
challenged only as a traditional taking. The remedy would not lie within the
Judicial Takings Doctrine because no court actually changed or
substantially modified a state law.

174. See, e.g., Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2607 (2010).
175. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003.
176. Admittedly, this is a subjective determination open to a great degree of
interpretation. The author does not affirmatively support or envision an objective test that
could adequately take into account all of the considerations needed in making this
determination.
177. See supra Part III.C.
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V. CONCLUSION
Adoption of the Judicial Takings Test, outlined in Part IV,178 would not
change the result in Stop the Beach. Petitioner in Stop the Beach did not
have an established right to accretions or independent contact with the
water that superseded the State’s right to maintain the coastlines.179 Within
the background principles of Florida law and without a greater deprivation,
it would be unreasonable to conclude that a private property owner’s
interest in maintaining, in perpetuity, an unchanging boundary with the
water would rise to the level of being a reasonable expectation.
Even within the confines of Florida property law, it is possible that a
similar property deprivation could render a different result. For instance, a
different result could be reached in the case of a property owner who could
prove a quantifiable economic deprivation, coupled with a reasonable
expectation under Lucas, that his property rights would remain undisturbed
by state action.180 If nothing else, the Court’s opinion in Stop the Beach
sends a clear message to state courts that their actions concerning property
law are not immune from constitutional scrutiny.
While a Due Process Clause analysis presents an attractive option for
challenging a court decision that changes or substantially alters a state
property law, its jurisprudential viability is problematic and any remedy it
could provide is uncertain.
The Takings Clause “‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior.”181 Since the
Takings Clause provides an explicit constitutional protection from
government action that affects property, courts should not be permitted to
use the generalized notion of substantive Due Process to analyze these
claims.182
A narrowly tailored Judicial Takings Doctrine has the potential to
provide an additional protective measure against a measurable judicial
change in property law. Additionally, it would create assurance and
predictability for businesses and other investors who want to purchase and
develop property on the nation’s coastline or waterways.
178. See supra Part IV.
179. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2612-13.
180. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035.
181. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 395 (1994)).
182. Id.; see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
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It is significant that in Stop the Beach, six of the eight voting Justices held
that if it is found that a judicial change in property law deprives an owner of
a right the owner once had, then there is a remedy. Adoption of a Judicial
Takings Doctrine, as outlined in Part IV, will provide a certain remedy,
which takes into account economic deprivation while leaving intact a state’s
sovereign right to enact substantive property law.

